his pper investigtes the welfre nd eonomi stilistion properties of (sl trnsfers shemes etween memers of monetry union sujet to sovereign spred shoksF he shemesD whih onsist of rossEountry trnsfer rules triggered when sovereign spreds widenD re inorported in twoEountry model with (nnil fritions estimted for ortugl nd the iurozoneF he model is well suited to study shoks onsistent with the sovereign det risis tht 'eted the eriphery of the iurozoneF st is shown thtD when domesti (sl poliy is rried through lump sum txtionD (sl trnsfers re oth welfre improving nd redue mroeonomi instilityF roweverD symmetries in the ondut of domesti (sl poliy n tilt the distriution of welfre gins etween the two ountriesF yn the ontrryD when domesti (sl poliy is distortionryD (sl trnsfers might use welfre lossesD despite stilising the eonomy nd reduing the (sl djustment required in the ftermth of sovereign spred shoksF JEL Classication: iTPD pISD pRID pRPD pRSF
Introduction
he dete over the rhiteture of roust monetry union ttrted renewed interest during the reent sovereign det risis in iuropeF he symmetril nture of sovereign interest rte shoksD oupled with the inherent onstrints they pose on domesti (sl poliyD exposed pinful fult ‡ Banco de España, Email: dealmeida.bandeira@gmail.com This paper does not represent the views of the Bank of Spain or the Eurosystem.
in the design of the iuro reF his fult onerns the lk of dequte mehnisms to filitte the djustments of individul memer sttes fing idiosynrti shoksF es seen during the risisD soring sovereign spreds fored numer of ountriesD inluding qreeeD srelndD stlyD ortugl nd pinD to undertke sudden (sl onsolidtions while implementing deep struturl reformsF he drmti eonomi toll of the risis nd the duious response from the monetry union lled into question the irreversiility of the ommon urrenyF his pper proposes nd estimtes model of monetry union where sovereign spreds 'et privte orrowing osts due to (nnil fritionsF he ontriution to the urrent dete is twofoldF pirstD the model is designed to provide onsistent nrrtive of the events tht ourred during the sovereign det risisD introduing the link etween sovereign spreds nd the nking setor whih ws root use for the ontrtion in the supply of redit to the eonomyF he model lso o'ers useful frmework to understnd the need for (sl djustment during the risisD demonstrting how (sl onsolidtion is 'eted y the responsiveness of sovereign spreds to the (sl stne nd y the rtio of puli det to qhF eondD this pper presents n ssessment of the potentil ene(ts tht (sl trnsfers etween memer sttes hve in terms of welfre nd eonomi stilityF iquipped with the pproprite modelD it desries two lterntive trnsfer shemesD disusses the importne of domesti (sl onditions for the design of suh shemesD nd explins how the ondut of (sl poliy t the memer sttes level n 'et the mroeonomi outomes of federl (sl rrngementF huring the sovereign det risisD the fll in government ond pries nd the downEgrding of these ssets y redit rting genies severely wekened the lne sheets of nksF es onE sequene of their exposure to sovereign riskD nks9 ility to rise mrketEsed funding ws dE versely 'etedF his inrese in orrowing osts fored nks to strengthen their equity rtios ndD in the proessD to shrply redue overll redit provision to (rms nd to rise lending rtesF gredit srity dmpened investmentD whih ultimtely resulted in the reessionF o pture this mehnismD (nnil intermediries re introdued in n otherwise stndrd twoEountry generl equilirium model of monetry unionF sn the modelD nks tke shortEterm deposits from houseE holds nd mke longEterm lons to (rms nd to the governmentF en geny prolem etween nks nd their depositors fores the former to moderte their leverge rtios in order to ttrt depositsF woreoverD euse nks hold sovereign onds in their portfoliosD their net worth is exposed to sovereign riskF sn good timesD the sovereign otins funds t the riskEfree interest rteF roweverD spred n rise on top of the riskEfree rte re)eting the redit worthiness of the governmentF his deteriortes the equity vlue of nks nd fores them to ontrt redit nd to rise lending rtes t the sme time s they retin funds to uild up their net worthF sn the modelD for rtio of puli det to qh of 60%D 10% inrese in sovereign spreds leds to n inrese of out 3.5% in the interest rtes hrged to (rmsF he pssEthrough is reinfored when the puli detEtoEqh rtio equls 120%D with interest rtes on privte lending rising 7.5%F ogether with the inrese in orrowing ostsD the drop in the supply of redit to (rms uses investment to drop shrply nd sprks reessionF et the troughD rel qh flls etween 2% nd 6%D depending on the size of the puli detEtoEqh rtioF hese e'ets re mgni(ed when sovereign spreds respond to the (sl outlookD nd more so for higher puli detEtoEqh rtiosF he size of this rtio nd of the feedk loop lso hve implitions for (sl poliyF P ith soring spredsD the onsolidtion e'ort required to stilise the (sl stne is intensi(ed for higher det rtios nd when spreds re more responsiveF his is true for lump sum txtion s well s for distortionry (sl poliyF woreoverD euse distortionry poliy reinfores the fll in eonomi tivityD rising onsumption txes or utting produtive or utilityEenhning puli spending requires the (sl djustment to e lrgerF gompleting the iw with federl (sl rrngement is hrdly novel ide in poliy nd demi irlesF et the time when its design ws eing disussedD it seemed ler tht system of (sl trnsfers rfted to ountervil idiosynrti shoks would e ruil for the suess of the single urrenyF 1 he rguments in support of trnsfer mehnism drew diretly on the literture of optiml urreny resF 2 ith the retion of the iwD memer sttes would no longer e le to use monetry poliy or the exhnge rte to u'er ountryEspei( shoksF woreoverD to the extent tht prodution ftors re immoile ross ountries nd movements in nominl pries nd wges re slowD (sl poliy eomes key instrument to fuel the neessry djustmentsF ith this in mindD the wstriht rety inorported limits on udget de(its nd puli dets in order to preserve sound domesti (sl stnes le to ret when neededF etD the politil proess imed t endowing the union with n reEwide (sl pity ly dormnt for dedes until the sovereign det risisD when domesti (sl poliies filed to operte the required djustmentsF ped with the inility of the iw to respond dequtely nd promptlyD poliy leders hve reently skethed rod mp towrds the retion of n reEwide (sl stiliztion pityF 3 he present pper exmines the designD implementility nd quntittive e'ets of federl (sl pityF wo trnsfers shemes re studiedX one hs governments engging in nonErepyle trnsE fersD with the government mking the trnsfers funding them through the domesti puli udgetF he other sheme ssumes tht governments re lled upon to repy the trnsfers they reeiveD ut under etter (nnil terms thn in mrket onditionsF foth shemes re shown to hve the potentil to inrese welfre in the two regions of the monetry unionD with gins pprohing 1% of lifeEtime onsumption nd eing reltively higher when trnsfers do not hve to e repidF pisl trnsfers redue mroeonomi instilityD with qhD onsumptionD lour nd in)tion voltility eing reduedF hen the puli detEtoEqh rtio is higherD sovereign spreds re responsive to movements to the (sl stneD or when (sl poliy ts more quikly ginst those movementsD (sl trnsfers n seure higher reltive welfre ginsF roweverD the distriution of welfre gins etween the two ountries might not e symmetriF sn ftD the symmetry in welfre gins etween ountries n e prolemti ftor to the implementtion of (sl trnsfersF imple exerises show thtD y hnging domesti (sl poliy unilterlly fter the greement on (sl trnsfer sheme is losedD government n tilt the distriution of welfre ginsF hile (sl trnsfers n improve welfre when governments use lump sum txtion to trget the (sl stneD the sme is not true when (sl poliy is distortionryF sn this seD nd despite the ility of (sl trnsfers to redue the mgnitude of distortionry (sl djustments in reipient ountriesD the negtive e'ets of funding the sheme use welfre to fllF st is shownD 1 See, for instance, the MacDougall report (European Commission, 1977) as well as the Delors (1989) report. 2 See the seminal articles by Mundell (1961) , McKinnon (1963) , and Kenen (1969) . 3 The 5 Presidents Report (Juncker et al., 2015) is the last high level policy contribution. It draws on and updates earlier proposals, namely by Van Rompuy et al. (2012) . The proposed mechanism, to be implemented before 2025, is to be deployed when domestic scal policy cannot, on its own, counteract large asymmetric shocks. See also IMF (2013) for discussion.
Q howeverD tht (sl trnsfers under distortionry domesti (sl poliy n still e used to stilize the eonomyF por instneD when the domesti (sl instrument is onsumption txtion or the proE vision of utilityEenhning puli goodsD (sl trnsfers n redue the voltility of qhD lour nd in)tionD ut not the voltility of onsumptionF yn the ontrryD when the provision of produtive puli good is the (sl instrument ville to memerEstte governmentsD (sl trnsfers hve the potentil to redue the voltility of ll these vrilesD even if reduing welfreF he ftermth of the sovereign det risis reopened n intense disussion over the design nd implementtion of suprEntionl (sl mehnism to id individul memer sttes to ope with lrge nd idiosynrti shoksF nlike in previous osionsD when suh sheme ws eventully droppedD it ppers tht the onsensus mong iuropen leders nd poliy mkers is moving towrds its onstrution in the ner futureF st isD thereforeD ruil to ssess the impt suh mehnism n hve nd investigte under whih onditions its implementtion n sueedF his pper provides ontriution in tht diretionF
Literature: his pper is relted to two strnds of the litertureF yn the one hndD it extends the literture on the implitions of sovereign spreds for eonomi stilityF hert nd vn ijnerE gen (2011) nd fonm nd vukkezen (2013)D for instneD fous on the intertions etween (slD monetryD nd exhnge rte poliiesD in n environment where sovereign spreds re introdued s preemptive gme etween the government nd speultorsF he prsimonious wy they model sovereign spreds is lso used in the present pperF gorsetti et lF (2012) study how the sovereign risk hnnel exertes ylil shoks in n environment where monetry poliy n e onstrined t the zero lower ound nd nlyse the e'ets of (sl retrenhment in lleviting mroeonomi )ututionsF fool ( he reminder of the pper is strutured s followsF he next setion desries the model eonomyD motivtes the nonEstndrd fetures tht hve een introdued to mth the sovereign det risis oserved in the eriphery of the iurozoneD nd summrizes the results of the estimtion of the modelF etion Q strts with the nlysis of the trnsmission of sovereign spred shoksD investigting the di'erenes generted y lterntive (sl instruments governments n use to stilise the (sl stneF st then proposes two trnsfer shemes etween ountries nd disusses their welfre nd eonomi stilistion properties when governments use lump sum txtionF pinllyD the nlysis of the welfre nd stility outomes of the trnsfer shemes is extended to when domesti (sl poliy is distortionryF etion R onludesF 2 The Model his setion lys out generl equilirium model of monetry unionF he union is omposed of two open eonomies with hits in onsumptionD stiky pries nd wgesD (nnil fritionsD nd investment djustment ostsF he two ountriesD whih will e referred to s eriphery nd goreD re of sizes n nd 1 − nD respetivelyF rouseholds in eh ountry deposit their svings in domesti nks nd provide lour to domesti produer (rmsF rouseholds in one ountry n lso trde nonEontingent onds with households in the other ountryF fnks serve s (nnil intermediries etween domesti households nd domesti orrowersF hey sell longEterm lons to wholesle (rms nd to the governmentD ut hve their intermedition tivity onstrined y their leverge rtiosF ih ountry produes ontinuum of trdele intermedite goods tht re ggregted into (nl nonEtrdele goodD with the ltter eing onsumed y householdsD the governmentD nd used for investmentF ih ntionl government n rise txes nd issue longEterm onds to (nne puli expenditureD while the reEwide entrl nk sets the nominl interest rte ording to feedEk rule trgeting ggregte in)tion nd output growthF he following susetions desrie the eonomy of the eriphery in more detilF he desription of the gore is omitted for revity sine its struture is nlogous to the eripheryF ell vriles re in per capita termsD the onventionl denotes foreign vriles or prmeters @iFeFD those of the goreAD nd the susript h @f A denotes goods produed in the eriphery @goreA nd respetive priesF 2.1 Households here is one in(nitely lived household omposed of ontinuum of mesure 1 of household memersX frtion 1 − f re workers nd frtion f re nkersF he former supply lour to nonE(nnil (rms nd reeive wgesD while the ltter mnge (nnil intermediry for pro(tsF rousehold memers swith etween the two ouptions ut keep the reltive proportion of eh type onstntF hile nker remins tive in the following period with proility λ f D frtion (1 − λ f ) f of nkers retire nd eome workersF gonverselyD eh period the sme numer of workers rndomly eome nkersF rousehold memers re ssumed to pool onsumption risk perfetlyF heir lifeEtime utility S is given yX
with instntneous utility of the formX
1 + ϕ i 0 denotes the expettions opertor onditionl on the informtion ville up to t = 0 nd β ∈ (0, 1) is the household9s disount ftorF rouseholds derive utility from onsumptionD whih is sujet to externl hit formtion ∈ (0, 1)D nd disutility from lourD where ϕ > 0 is the inverse elstiity of lour supply nd ζ > 0 its reltive weightF rouseholds n deposit their svings with domesti nks nd n trde foreign onds in interntionl (nnil mrketsF he udget onstrint of the householdD in rel termsD is given yX
where b i,b denotes deposits with domesti nksD whih py the rel interest rte r h,t−1 D nd b i,f denotes onds trded with households rod nd whih py the rel interest rte r f,t−1 F por ese of expositionD the udget onstrint is written suh tht b i,b > 0 implies positive svings from the householdsD while b i,f > 0 implies tht the household is net orrower in interntionl mrketsF he term Ψ (·) denotes onvex osts inurred on holdings of onds trded in interntionl mrketsF es onsequene of eing in monetry unionD the nominl exhnge rte etween the two ountries is (xed nd therefore the rel exhnge rteD e t D is simply equl to the rtio of onsumer pries in eh ountryF rouseholds reeive lour inomeD t the rel wge rte w i,t D rel pro(ts from (rmsD whih is denoted y V t D nd py lumpEsum txes to the governmentD T t F he (rstEorder onditions for onsumption nd for (nnil sset holdings reX
e t+1 e t r f,t 1 − Ψ @RA where ς t is the multiplier on the udget onstrint nd Λ t,t+1 = ς t+1 /ς t is the rtio of mrginl utilities of onsumption etween t nd t + 1F
xominl wge rigidities re introdued s in ireg et lF (2000) y ssuming tht households re monopolisti suppliers of di'erentited lour serviesD hving mrket power to negotite wges with intermedite good produersF sn turnD intermedite good produers use omposite lour 5 The subscript i has been dropped since, due to perfect risk sharing, the rst-order conditions are common across household members.
T input in produtionD l t D whih they otin y ggregting the di'erentited lour servies ording
he demnd urve for lour servies from household i is thus given yX
where w i,t is the rel wge household i hrges in order to supply l i,t D nd the rel prie index of the omposite lour input is given y
F he elstiity of sustitution etween lour servies supplied y di'erent households is given y µ w F sn eh periodD only frtion 1−λ w of households n reEoptimize their posted nominl wgeF hen le to soD household i solvesX
1 + ϕ sujet to @IA nd @SAF he (rstEorder ondition with respet to the optiml nominl wgeD w * t D is given yX
where l i,t+s|t ≡ (w * t /w t+s ) −τw l t+s is the lour supplied in period t + s for those households tht lst negotited their nominl wge t tF
Banks
he nking setor desried in qertler nd urdi (2011) is extended in this pperD with nks lso providing funds to the governmentF fnks rise deposits from domesti households nd lend to domesti nonE(nnil (rms nd to the governmentF st is ssumed tht the domesti nking setor holds the totl mount of puli det issued y the governmentF es in vm nd nl (2014)D nkers do not engge in rossEorder deposits or investment tivitiesF s motivte these two ssumptions with the following stylized ftsF sn 2011D t the height of the sovereign det risisD round 80% of sovereign det lims on ountries in the eriphery of the iurozone were held y domesti nksF woreoverD domesti government ond holdings in the eriphery ounted for 93% of nks9 equityF his home is in sovereign ond holdingsD lthough not s highD ws lso present in the gore of the monetry unionF hese (gures hd een mrkedly rising sine 2009F yn the other hndD ntionl nks represented roughly 75% of externl (nning to domesti privte (rmsF gonsistent with the theory proposed in this pperD when sovereign spreds strted to widen in the eripheryD from 2008 to 2013D the volume of newly issued lons fell y more thn 50%F lend funds to wholesle produers nd to the governmentD a i,x,t nd a i,b,t respetivelyF henoting y n i,t the net worth of (nnil intermediry i nd y W i,t the totl vlue of its ssetsD the lne sheet of nk i is then given yX
where q j,t is the reltive prie of lims a i,j,t F hepositors hrge the rel interest rte r h,t D wheres nks require return of r x,t on the lons they mke to (rmsF he interest rte on government ondsD r b,t D is ssumed to equl the riskEfree rte djusted y sovereign redit risk premium δ t+1 X r h,t = i t r b,t (1 − δ t+1 ) @VA ewriting @UAD the evolution of nk i9s net worth depends on the di'erene etween ernE ings on ssets nd interest pyments on liilitiesX
+r h,t−1 n i,t−1 @WA qrowth in equity ove the riskEfree return r h,t depends on the premium (r x,t − r h,t ) erned on privte lending s well s on the return on sovereign detF he ojetive of nkers is to mximize their expeted terminl net worthX
o the extent tht the expeted disounted returns on their ssets re higher thn the riskEfree rteD nkers will wnt to rise deposits nd uild their net worth inde(nitelyF roweverD morl hzrd prolem etween depositors nd nkers limits nks levergeF his ours euseD t ny given periodD nkers n divert frtion ι of ville ssetsF rving knowledge of thisD depositors n fore the nk into nkruptyD ut n only reover the remining 1 − ι of fundsF reneD depositors will only supply funds to the nk if the following inentiveEomptiility onstrint is stis(edX 
is the shre of government det in the nk9s portfolio nd Ω t,t+1 D the nker9s e'etive disount ftorD is given yX
es shown in qertler nd urdi (2011)D when @IIA is indingD the leverge rtio eomes onstnt ross to ll nkers nd equl to
por positive vlues of net worthD the onstrint inds only if 0 < ν t < ιF ith ν t > 0D it is pro(tle to expnd W i,t F roweverD if ν t > ιD the inentive onstrint does not ind sine the vlue from intermedition exeeds the gin from diverting fundsF sn the equiliri studied in this pperD the inentiveEomptiility onstrint lwys inds within neighourhood of the stedy stteF ht isD the mount of funds nks n intermedite is limited y their net worth due to the orrowing onstrintF eggregte net worth is the sum of the net worth of existing nks plus the strtEup funds of entering nksF urviving nks rry their totl netEworth into the next periodD wheres new nks reeive frtion / (1 − λ f ) of the ssets of exiting nks in order to strt usinessF reneD in ggregteX
Capital producers: erfetly ompetitive pitl produers uy nd repir undepreited pitl from wholesle (rms nd invest in new pitl y purhsing nd trnsforming domesti (nl goodsF he repired nd newly reted pitl is then sold to wholeslers s n input to produtionF he disounted rel pro(t of pitl produersD Π CP D is given yX
The eective discount rate of bankers diers from that of the households due to the nancial friction.
W where q x,t is the vlue of one unit of new pitl nd z t denotes the mount of (nl goods invested to generte new pitlF gpitl produers re ssumed to inur djustment osts when investing in new pitlF he lw of motion of pitl is thus given yX
with ψ governing investment djustment ostsF ustituting @IVA in the ojetive funtion of pitl produersD the optiml level of investment is given yX
Wholesale rms: erfetly ompetitive wholesle (rms use the omposite lour input nd pitl in order to produe homogeneous goodF hey purhse pitl from pitl produers t the rel prie q x,t D nd (nne their pitl quisition y orrowing from domesti nksF fnks thus need to issue lims a x,t equl to the numer of units of pitl quired k t D priing eh lim t the prie of unit of pitlF efter produtionD wholeslers sell their pitl to pitl produers nd py the return r x,t over their lonsF he homogeneous good is sold to domesti retilers t the rel prie p x,t F he prodution funtion of wholesle (rms is given yX
where ξ s t is the totl ftor produtivityD ξ u t drifting lourEugmenting tehnology ommon to oth ountries nd α is the weight of pitl in produtionF he demnd urve for omposite lour servies is given yX
erfet ompetition imposes zero pro(ts nd therefore the exEpost rel return pid to nks is given yX
Retail rms: e ontinuum of retil (rms indexed y i ∈ [0, n] purhse the homogeneous good produed y wholeslers t the prie p x,t nd di'erentite it into ontinuum of retil goods tht re sold to (nl good (rms t home nd rodF reneD retiler i fes the following demnd urveX
where y h,t nd y h,t denote the ggregte demnd for domesti retil goods y the eriphery nd the goreD respetivelyD nd where the lw of one prie is impliitly ssumed to holdF etil (rms re IH sujet to glvo prie stikinessF ivery periodD retiler is le to djust pries with proility 1 − λ p F hen retil (rms do not reEoptimize priesD they simply updte them to lgged in)tionF etil pries followX
where indextion is governed y ϑ ∈ [0, 1]D mesure of the extent to whih pries djust to pst in)tionF hen llowed to djust priesD retiler i mximizes the strem of rel disounted pro(tsD 
@PTA where τ ≡ (1 − n) /n normlizes the mount of imported goods into per capita termsF sn the ove gi ggregtorD the homeEis prmeter denotes the frtion of goods produed t home tht is used in the prodution of the (nl goodF he elstiity of sustitution etween homeEprodued nd imported intermedite goods is given y γF pinl good produers mximize pro(ts p t y t − p h,t y h,t − p f,t τ y f,t eh periodD sujet to @PTAF he resulting optiml demnd funtions re given yX
he onsumer prie indexD p t D is otined y plugging in @PUA nd @PVA into @PTAX
Government he government levies lumpEsum txesD T t D nd issues sovereign ondsD d g,t D to (nne exogenous government expenditure gF qovernment det is held y domesti (nnil intermediriesD whih re ssumed to provide the government with the mount of funds it requiresF 8 reneD in the ggregteD the numer of lims held y nks must equl the totl mount orrowed y the governmentD a b,t = d g,t F vumpEsum txtion trgets the puli detEtoEqh rtio ording toX
where κ τ hrterises the government9s preferenes etween txE nd detE(nned expenditure nd s t ≡ d g,t /gdp t is the (sl stneF imilrly to ghtterjee nd iyigungor (2013) nd fool (2014)D the government is sE sumed to issue longEterm seuritiesF reneD eh period government onds mture with proility λ b D implying n verge durtion of onds of 1/λ b periodsF hen onds reh mturityD the govE ernment pys k the priniplY otherwise investors reeive the oupon µ b nd retin the right to otin the prinipl in the futureF he government9s ex post udget onstrint is therefore given yX
where q b,t is the prie of lons to the governmentF gonverselyD the return on government onds is given yX
overeign redit risk is modelled s in hert nd ijnergen (2011) nd gorsetti et lF (2012)F he government9s deision not to honour its dets depends on scal limit ove whih the (sl urden is deemed to e politilly uneptleF 9 overeign spreds re generted s the result of preemptive gme etween the government nd speultorsD with the expeted proility of defult eing determining ftor for the dynmis of sovereign ond pries ndD onsequentlyD of the net worth of nksF ivery period the scal limit is drwn from distriution with proility distriution funtion f (s t )F egents only know f (·) nd form their expettions on tht sisD with the proility of defult eing equl to the proility the (sl stne s t exeeds the scal limitF vet ∆ (s t ) e defult inditor tking 1 when the drw is ove the scal limitD nd zero otherwiseF es shown in hert nd ijnergen ( IP the proility of defult n e pproximted yX
where ¢ denotes (rstEorder logEliner pproximtionD nd where ε d t is n exogenous shok tht ptures the mrket9s pereption of sovereign redit riskF he prmeters Θ denotes the elstiity of the proility of defult with respet to hnges in the (sl stneD ∂∆ (s t ) /∂s t F 2.5
Central Bank he single entrl nk in the monetry union is ssumed to follow trgeting rule y whih the nominl interest rte responds to the ggregte onsumer prie index nd to the reEwide rel qh
where ρ i ∈ (0, 1) is the smoothing prmeterD nd ρ π nd ρ g re the usul response oe0ientsF he ggregte vriles in the ylor ruleD denoted with ∼D re the sum of the respetive ountry vriles weighted y their popultion sizeF he nominl interest rte is given y the pisher equtionX
2.6 Market Clearing here re two types of mrkets for goods in eh ountry tht must ler in equiliriumF por intermedite goodsD prodution y the wholesle (rms equls demnd y domesti nd foreign retilersX x t = Υ h,t y h,t + y h,t @QSA xote thtD due to prie dispersionD retilers inur rel losses during prie settingD whih is given y Υ h,t F 10 yn the other hndD the nonEtrdele domesti (nl good is sold to householdsD the government nd to pitl produersX
roldings of interntionlly trded (nnil ssets must lso lerD b f,t + b f,t = 0F el qh is de(ned sX gdp t = p h,t y h,t + e t p h,t y h,t @QUA 10 Expression (35), and the denition of Υ h,t , are obtained from the aggregation of retail production xt = 1 0
IQ with net exports eing given yX
where y h,t re exports of the homeEprodued retil goods nd y f,t re imports of the foreignEprodued goodsF 2.7 Distortionary Fiscal Policy etul onsolidtion mesures put forwrd during the sovereign det risis fll outside the tegory of lump sum txtionF emong the rnge of distortionry instruments used y iuropen governmentsD this pper onsiders threeX rising onsumption txesD utting utilityEenhning puli spending or produtive puli expenditureF es disussed elowD the (rst two instrumentsD y diretly 'eting households deisions over onsumptionD hve the potentil to mth the response of onsumption in the model to the reent experiene in the eriphery of the iurozoneF yn the other hndD the use of produtive puli expenditure to stilise the (sl stne is intended to emphsise the link etween (sl poliy nd rel tivityF ynly one (sl instrument is ssumed to e ville to the government t one timeF he following hnges re mde to the seline model to inorporte eh new (sl instrumentX Consumption Tax: ith onsumption txtionD the government is ssumed to tx household onsumption t the rte τ c,t F he households udget onstrint then writesX
nd the (rstEorder ondition @PA is repled yX
he government is ssumed to hold lump sum txtion nd government spending (xedF st sets τ c,t
in similr fshion to @QHAD with κ c determining how quik the tx rte hnges in order to stilise the (sl stneF Utility-Enhancing Public Expenditure: nder this senrioD the government uses puli expenditureD g t D to onsolidte or expnd the (sl udget in order to smooth out hnges to the (sl stneF woreoverD government spending onsists of puli good tht is provided to householdsF es suhD the households instntneous utility tkes the formX
IR wherec i,t is gi ggregtor of privte onsumption nd the puli goodX
1 γc @RIA with γ c < 0D so tht privte onsumption nd onsumption of the puli good re omplementsD while c ounts for the shre of the privte good in the onsumption undleF he (rstEorder ondition @PA is then repled yX
he government follows rule for g t in line with @QHAD with κ g lirting the mgnitude of the (sl response to movements to the puli detEtoEqh rtioF he government onsumes domesti (nl goods to produe the puli goodD does not tx onsumptionD nd holds lump sum txes (xedF Productive Public Expenditure: sn this senrioD puli spending is ssumed to enter the privte prodution of intermedite goodsX
with χ governing the e'et of government expenditure on privte produtionX the higher the vlue of χ the stronger is the impt of (sl poliy on the produtivity of wholesle (rmsF es eforeD government expenditure onsumes domesti (nl goodsF he government sets g t following n equiE vlent rule to the one used with respet to the previous instrumentD does not tx onsumptionD nd holds lump sum txes (xedF
Estimation Results
he model is estimted for ortugl nd the iurozone using fyesin tehniquesF sn the spring of PHIID ortugl eme the third iurozone memerEstte to request externl (nne ssistneD fter qreee nd srelndF et the timeD the ortuguese government ws fing n unpreedented inrese in the osts of (nning puli detD while ortuguese nks were eing ut o' from mrketEsed fundingF hen the ssistne progrmme ws signed in eprilD the IHEyer yield on ortuguese government onds ws pprohing 10%D puli det to qh ws round 110%D nd the (sl de(it hd rehed 11.2% the previous yerF ith the progrmD ortugl reeived ¿78 illionD or out 43% of qhD under the onditionlity of implementing shrp (sl onsolidtion nd pursuing struturl reformsF 11 e full desription of the estimtion strtegy nd results n e found in the ppendixF yne period in the model equtes to one qurterF huring estimtionD oth governments re onsidered to only hve ess to lump sum txtionF ortugl9s popultion represents round 3% of the totl of the iurozoneD with the ltter9s qh per capita round 1.7 times higher thn ortugl9sF he shre IS of imports to qh represents out 30%F istimtion results show tht pries re slightly slower to djust in ortugl thn in the iurozoneD tking more thn 3 qurters on vergeF sndextion to pst in)tion seems to e smll in oth regionsD while wge stikiness ppers to e signi(ntly higher in the iurozoneF rits in onsumption re similr in oth ountriesD t round 0.5D wheres investment djustment osts re estimted to e higher in ortuglF elthough rnge of 15 struE turl shoks were onsidered during estimtionD in the following setions only symmetri sovereign redit risk shok in eh ountry will e onsideredF 3 Sovereign Spread Shocks and Fiscal Transfers his setion strts y looking t the trnsmission of sovereign spred shoks in the model nd disussing its onsisteny with the sovereign det risis in the eriphery of the iurozoneF he disussion is lso foused on the impt di'erent (sl instruments hve on the trnsmission of these shoksF he following susetion proposes two trnsfers shemes operted etween governments nd investigtes the welfre nd eonomi stility e'ets of their implementtionF he lst susetion extends the nlysis of the trnsfer shemes to when governments use distortionry (sl poliy to stilise the (sl stneF 3.1 Inspecting the Mechanism Lump Sum Taxation: pigure I reports the impulse responses to shok tht rises the sovereign spred in the eriphery y 10% in nnul termsD s seen in ortugl during 2011F he solid lue line shows the seline spei(tionD where government det to qh equls 60% in the stedy stteD sovereign spreds do not respond to the (sl stneD Θ = 0D nd the government uses lumpEsum txtion to mnge osilltions of the puli detEtoEqh rtioF he inrese in the proility tht the government will not servie its det lowers the vlue of government onds ndD onverselyD rises the premium investors require to hold these ssetsF es interest pyments eome hevierD the government inurs udget de(itD whih rises the stok of puli detF ith puli det inresingD txes re utomtilly risedF gompring to the tul de(it of 7.4% in ortugl in 2011D the jump in the udget de(it predited y the modelD of round 1%D seems firly smllF xote however tht etween 2010 nd 2013D txes nd soil ontriutions fell y more thn 2%D while unemployment ene(tsD pensionsD nd other (nnil liilities ll inresed @iuropen gommissionD 2014AF hereforeD the seline senrio serves s lower ound in terms of the deteriorting e'ets of sovereign spred shoks on the government udgetF es the prie of government onds plungesD nksD who hold these seurities in their portfoE liosD see their totl net worth ontrtF his triggers persistent inrese in nks9 leverge rtiosF sn terms of mgnitudes nd reovery timeD the model is onsistent with tul eventsF sing the lonEtoEdeposits rtio s mesure of levergeD the (gure for ortuguese nks t the eginning of 2011 ws equl to 157%F st took 15 qurters to reh 117%D fll of out 25% nd similr to pigure IF fnks9 equity lso went through slow reoveryD with the verge gore ier I djusting from 8.1% to 12% over the sme periodF 12 hue to leverge onstrintsD nks re fored to redue Impulse responses are expressed in terms of percent deviations from the steady state.
lending nd to rise the premium on lons to privte (rms in order to reuild the vlue of their equityF sn the seline senrioD the pssEthrough of sovereign spreds to (rm9s orrowing osts is more thn 1/3D with the inrese y 10% in the former leding to 3.5% inrese in the ltterF he drop in redit supplied y nks nd the inrese in orrowing osts indue ollpse in investment of more thn 10% t the troughF es (rms fe higher osts of pitlD lour demnd lso ontrts nd totl employment fllsF gonsequentlyD rel output fllsD rehing drop of more thn 2% t the troughF he mrked ontrtion in domesti demnd due to the fll in investment indues pries to fllF roweverD given the smll size of ortugl reltive to the iurozoneD the nominl interest rte is ut y less thn 5 sis pointsD negligile poliy loosening doing very little to u'er the reession in ortuglF yn the other hndD with lumpEsum txtion nd the fll in priesD nd despite the fll in employmentD households inrese onsumptionF his result is t odds with the reent experienes in the eriphery of the iurozoneF sn prtD this result is due to the ft tht households re net lenders in the modelF xoteD howeverD tht other (sl @nd distortionryA onsolidtion mesures were implemented during the sovereign det risisF hese n ount for with 10% inrese in the sovereign spred induing widening of the privte risk premium of more thn 7.5%F he resulting ollpse in investment nd the drop in lour re sizele too nd ompre well with tul (gures for ortuglX from 2011 to 2013D investment fell nerly 30%D while the unemployment rte went from 12.2% to 17.3%F
pinllyD the dshed lightEgrey lines in pigure I report the worst senrioD when the puli detEtoEqh rtio equls 120% nd sovereign spreds respond to the (sl stneD Θ = 0.03F nE like when the puli det represents 60% of qhD hving sovereign spreds responding to the (sl stne under this senrio genertes igger reessionD with privte lending rtes jumping more thn 8% nd qh flling 0.5% furtherF reneD high puli detEtoEqh rtio is not only potentil soure of eonomi instility per seD it n lso generte sizele feedEk e'ets when sovereign spreds respond to the wekening of the (sl stneF woreoverD this exerise ssumes the stndrd response of sovereign spreds to e onstnt for oth detEtoEqh rtios @Θ = 0.03AF roweverD it is possile tht the elstiity of spreds is inresing with the detEtoEqh rtioF sf tht is the seD the size of the feedEk e'ets reported in pigure I is rther ised downwrdsF Distortionary Fiscal Policy: pigure P shows the responses of the eriphery to sovereign spred shok when the government uses distortionry (sl instrumentsF he vlues of the prmeters governing (sl poliyD κ τ D κ c nd κ g D re lirted suh tht the inrese in the (sl stne is pped t 3% under eh of the three distortionry instruments s well s under lump sum txtionF fy doing soD the onsolidtion e'ort is normlized nd the feedEk e'ets of (sl poliy to the eonomy re omprleF he remining prmeters re lirted s followsF he stedy stte tx rte on onsumption is set to 20%D in line with the se of ortugl efore the risisF he produtivity of the puli good in privte produtionD χD is set to 10%F pinllyD privte onsumption is ssumed to represent c = 80% of totl household onsumptionD nd γ c D whih governs the elstiity etween privte onsumption nd onsumption of the puli goodD is set to −0.8 suh tht they re omplementsF he solid lue lines in pigure P show the selineD when the government uses lump sum txtion to stilise the (sl stneF he dshed lightElue lines depit the senrio when the government uses onsumption txtion to keep the (sl stne to trgetF sn this senrioD the government is led to ollet more revenues thn in the selineF sn order to redue the puli detD it rises onsumption txes out 3 perentge points ove stedy stteF his inrese in txesD howeverD genertes ontrtion in onsumptionD with households sustituting onsumption tody for onsumption in the futureD when txes re ut kF ith the ontrtion in onsumption dding to the ontrtion in investmentD qh flls further thn in the selineD pushing up on the puli detEtoEqh rtion nd explining why revenues hve to e rised higher thn in the selineF he solid lightEgrey lines present the se when the (sl instrument used is puli good omplementry to privte onsumptionF o ur the inrese in the (sl stneD puli spending hs to e reduedD using gin qh to fll more thn in the selineF feuse privte onsumption IV Impulse responses are expressed in terms of percent deviations from the steady state.
nd onsumption of the puli good re omplementsD the ut in the provision of the puli good indues households to redue privte onsumption s wellF gompring with onsumption txtionD reduing the provision of utility enhning puli good hs more severe e'ets on output sine not only privte onsumption ontrtsD puli spending is lso reduedF ith suh omprehensive fll in demndD (rms ontrt lour demnd further nd households inrese leisureF pinllyD the dshed drkEgrey lines show the se when the (sl instrument is the provision of produtive puli goodF o p the rise of the (sl stne t 3%D the government hs to redue puli expenditure y nerly 7.5%F his ut sutrts 1% more to qh t the trough reltive to the selineF elthough the ehviour of investment is similr to the selineD lour flls y moreX s produtive puli spending fllsD the mrginl produtivity of lour flls s wellD nd lour demnd is reduedF he dded e'ets on investment re smllerD with the ontrtion of redit supply y nks lredy ounting for its shrp fllF gompring with the previous instrumentD the fll in qh is less severe when the puli good enters privte prodution insted of households utilityF his is explined y the ehviour of privte onsumptionD whih does not fll when produtive puli spending is utF es resultD the size of the (sl onsolidtion required to ur the rise of the (sl stne is lso smllerF es reported in pigure PD distortionry (sl poliy ggrvtes the reession used y sovereign spred shoksF sf the udgetry strin on the government is llevited ndD thereforeD if the onsolidtion e'ort tht is required is reduedD the distortionry e'ets of domesti (sl poliy n lso e mitigtedF he next susetion proposes two trnsfer shemes tht hieve this es shown in the previous susetionD the size of the puli detEtoEqh rtio nd its dynmi responseD together with the feedEk e'ets is hs on the sovereign spred itselfD re t the entre of the trnsmission of sovereign spred shoks to the eonomyF he extent of the pssEthrough of sovereign spreds to privte lending rtes nd the ontrtion in the quntity of redit to privte (rms re losely linked to the dynmis of the (sl udgetF sn order to u'er the trnsmission of sovereign spred shoksD the government n inrese lump sum txtionF ith inomplete interE ntionl (nnil mrketsD howeverD this might not e optimlF sn this susetionD two lterntive mehnisms re proposed nd dded to the estimted model to ssess their potentil welfre nd stility implitionsF he simplest of the proposed mehnisms onsists of federl trnsfers sheme @pA tht hs oth ountries operting trnsfers ross the order when sovereign spreds widenF rnsfers from the gore to the eriphery re determined y the following ruleX S t = κ s log (δ t ) − log δ @RRA where δ t is the sovereign redit risk premium de(ned oveF en equivlent expression de(nes the trnsfers to e mde the opposite diretionF S t D together with S t D denote ggregte trnsfers mde etween governmentsF fy de(nitionD trnsfers re only temporryD eing equl to zero in the longErunF smportntlyD the prmeter governing the mgnitude of the trnsfersD κ s D is equl for oth ountriesF he proposed p ddresses diretly the prolem of (sl strin due to sovereign spredsF es there is no diret trnsfers to households or (rmsD the feedk to the rel eonomy will e through the government udgetD nd its potentil impt on the nking systemF 13 huring the sovereign det risisD governments in ountries tht were more severely hit eventully requested externl (nnil ssistne in order to mitigte the unerle udgetry strin used y widening sovereign spredsF he vrious ssistne progrmmes put forwrd to these ountriesD whih inluded srelndD qreee nd ortuglD entiled redit lines under more fvourle (nnil onditions thn those o'ered y the mrketF snstedD reditors would e grnted the power to monitor the implementtion of onsolidtion mesures nd struturl reforms imed t improving the sustinility of the (sl stne of interventioned ountriesF he proposed p does not ontemplte the repyment of the trnsfers y the reipient ountryF elterntivelyD the seond mehnism ssumes tht (sl trnsfers hve to e pid kF his 13 In this paper I assume δt is observable and, therefore, can be used to guide policy. In reality, however, sovereign spread shocks might be dicult to measure. Importantly, it might also be the case that optimal transfers do not respond to all swings in sovereign spreads as measured, for instance, by the dierentials in government bond yields in the secondary market. It is also not clear that targeting a more fundamental measure, such as public debt to annual GDP, solves the problem. I leave these questions for future research. PQ nd of the welfre gins inreseF xot only re more trnsfers needed to u'er the propgtion of sovereign spred shoksD the potentil welfre gins from the p re tully more signi(nt thn in selineD leit still symmetrilly distriuted etween the two ountriesF sn terms of voltilitiesD howeverD their reltive redution is smller ompred to seline for ll vriles exept onsumptionF hen detEtoEqh is equl to 60% nd sovereign spreds re responsive to the (sl stneD Θ = 0.01D lthough the mgnitude of the trnsfers inresesD the welfre gins re not higher for oth regions reltive to the selineF hile oth regions still ene(t from the pD the reltive gins for the gore re not s high s in the selineF es some prmeter vlues di'er ross regionsD the vlue of κ s tht mximizes the omined welfre will not neessrily e the vlue tht mximizes welfre gins for eh region individullyF snterestinglyD the vlue of κ s is higher thn in the seline despite the negtive spillover e'ets on the nking setor of rising puli det to (nne (sl trnsfers when Θ = 0F ith lump sum txtion howeverD the gins from u'ering sovereign spred shoks pper to e higher thn the potentilly disruptive e'ets of (nning the trnsfersF he fourth olumn in pnel b) of le I reports the se when κ τ is rised from 0.3 to 1.4D implying stronger lump sum txtion retion to ur movements in the puli detEtoEqh rtioF eginD despite the inrese in the size of trnsfersD the gore ppers to ene(t reltively less in this senrio ompred to the selineD while the eriphery ene(ts reltively moreF ith the (sl stne more tightly ontrolledD the potentilly dverse e'ets of (nning trnsfers y issuing puli det re reduedF es κ s is hosen to mximise ggregte welfreD welfre gins under κ τ = 1.4 re not higher thn the seline for oth regions euse welfre gins in eh region pek for di'erent vlues of κ s F pinllyD olumns 5 nd 6 show the welfre nd stility gins when the orreltion of sovereign spred shoks ross the gore nd eripheryD insted of eing zeroD is positive or negtiveD respetivelyF elthough the vlue of κ s remins unhngedD it is ler tht negtively orrelted sovereign spred shoks led to higher potentil welfre nd stility ginsF sn line with pigure QD the lst olumn of pnel b) in le ID shows tht the vlue of κ s tht mximises the welfre of the monetry union under pv is higher thn tht otined under the pF roweverD the reltive welfre gins under this sheme re smllerF hile in)tion voltility flls y more in oth ountriesD lour nd qh voltility fll reltively more only in the goreF snterestinglyD onsumption voltility tully inreses in the goreF uppose tht (sl trnsfer sheme is to e greed in onjuntion with rules determining domesti (sl poliyF ss there n inentive for governments to devite from the greement ex post y setting domesti (sl poliy di'erentlyc le P reports simple exerises to nswer this questionF por eh threeEolumn setD the (rst two olumns show the level of trnsfers nd the welfre gins for two di'erent vlues of κ τ D iFeF hnging how quikly governments gree to smooth vritions in the (sl stne using lump sum txtionF he third olumn in eh set shows the welfre implitions of hoosing vlue for κ s onsistent with high κ τ D ut hving governments opting for low κ τ instedF he top pnel in le P reports these exerises over the hoies of κ τ nd κ s in the ontext of pD wheres the ottom pnel ssumes pv instedF issentillyD the tle explores whether symmetries in welfre gins etween the two regions n impir the implementtion of trnsfers sheme iming t mximizing unionEwide welfreF fy de(nitionD welfre gins nnot e higher in oth regions when the vlue of κ s di'ers PR * he vlues of κ τ re for the eripheryF sn the gore κ τ is kept onstnt t IFRF from tht whih mximizes the omined welfre of oth regions for given κ τ F roweverD y vrying κ τ ex postD it n hppen tht one region eomes etterEo' t the expense of the otherF nder pD this seems to e the se only when Θ = 0.01F sn this seD the eriphery otins slightly higher gin under p not onsistent with unionEwide welfre mximiztionD while the losses to the gore seem to e negligileF snterestinglyD for Θ = 0.01 nd under pvD it is the gore who ene(ts reltively moreF erhps more relisti senrioD howeverD is when only one government devites from the greementF his is reported in the lst four olumns oth pnels in le PF he (rst olumn shows the se when oth regions set κ τ = 1.4 nd negotite the vlue of κ s tht mximizes ggregte welfreF he seond olumn reports similr seD exept tht while the gore hooses κ τ = 1.4D the eriphery sets κ τ = 0.7F es disussed oveD this tilts the welfre ene(ts wy from the eriphery nd towrds the goreF he third olumn shows the senrio when the vlue of κ s is onsistent with oth regions greeing on κ τ = 1.4D ut the eriphery deviting unilterlly nd reduing κ τ to 0.7F sn this seD nd under pD gin no region seures higher reltive ginsD with the eriphery tully loosing reltively more @from welfre inresing 0.23% to only 0.10%AF yn the ontrryD hving the eriphery deviting unilterlly to lower κ τ under pv tully inreses the reltive welfre gins for the goreF roweverD insted of setting κ τ elow wht is greed under the trnsfer shemeD if the eriphery tully inreses κ τ the distriution of welfre gins is tilted in its fvourD s shown in the lst olumnF sn this seD the gore looses signi(ntly under oth trnsfer mehnismsF hese simple exerises show how potentilly ntgonisti inentives t the memerEstte9s levelD generted y symmetries in welfre gins derived from the (sl trnsfer rrngementsD n erode the support for the implementtion of suh rrngementsF hese on)iting inentives need to e refully ddressed in order to gurntee the rediility of p or of pvF sn prtiulrD for PS its implementtion to e suessfulD its design must e roust to ex post hnges in regionl (sl gompring the instrumentsD onsumption txtion is the lest desirle in terms of onE sumption voltilityD while using produtive expenditure to stilise the (sl stne is the most dmging poliy in terms of welfreF snterestinglyD howeverD using this instrument under p redues the voltility of ll vriles reported in the tleF sn terms of men vluesD reported in the ottom pnel of le QD trnsfers re found to redue the rel osts of prie dispersionF nder pvD the rel osts of wge dispersion re lso reduedF rnsfers in generl inrese the men vlue of onsumption in oth ountriesD nd the more so for the se of onsumption txtionF sn this 14 This is true for the baseline calibration.
PH
15 Both in terms of volatility and mean values.
16 A companion table to Table 3 , reporting sensitivity analysis over dierent values of the parameters governing domestic scal policy, can be consulted in the appendix. Figure 2 , the scal adjustment would still be smaller under the FTS. In that case, the scal stance would peak way below 3%, while the peak in the adjustment of the scal items
PT
would be above what is reported in Figure 4a , but clearly below the responses in Figure 2 . However, by changing the parameter values of the scal rule, such that the peak in the ratio of public debt-to-GDP is of the same magnitude with and without the transfers, the feed-back to the economy resulting from the moderation in the scal adjustment is magnied and easier to analyse.
PU the pvF pollowing rule @RRAD the pth of trnsfers from the gore to the eriphery trks tightly the evolution of the sovereign spredF vooking (rst t pigure RD nd ompring it to pigure PD the inrese in tx revenues or the ontrtion in puli spending in response to the inrese in the puli detEtoEqh rtio is notly smller under the pD with the djustment of either item eing less thn hlf of wht ws needed without the trnsfersF gompring pigure R to pigure RD when the reipient ountry is required to py the trnsfers k to its reditorsD the redution in the (sl djustment wrrnted y the trnsfers is less mrkedF sn dditionD the rtio of puli detEtoEqh now rises eyond 3%D nd remins higher for longer nd until ll trnsfersD plus interestsD re entirely repidF he feedEk e'ets re lso slightly lessenedD lthough still sizele when ompred to the senrio without trnsfersF nder oth mehnismsD trnsfers seem not to e 'eting the pth of investmentD with the redution in the domesti (sl e'ort required fter sovereign spred shok hving no e'et on the nking setorF 18 elterntively to stndrd (sl poliyD redit provision to nksD y mitigting the inrese in nks9 leverge nd the ontrtion in the supply of redit to the eonomyD ould potentilly u'er this setor for sovereign spred shoksF yn the one hndD howeverD the room for domesti governments to intervene in the nking system is reduedD s suh n intervention would 18 Keeping the values of κτ , κc, and κg unchanged form Figure 2 , albeit reducing the increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, does not change the dynamics of the banking sector nor of investment. This exercise can be consulted in the appendix. This is a result also present in Kollmann et al. (2013) for instance. To be precise, scal consolidation using distortionary instruments aects banks negatively by exacerbating the recession. This is visible in the slight increase in the private risk premium in Figure 2 . However, neither the FTS or the FLS seem to be able to reverse this.
19 Further discussion on this can be found in the appendix. Impulse responses are expressed in terms of percent deviations from the steady state. PW sheme of (sl trnsfers needs not only to u'er e'etively the eonomy from sovereign spred shoksD ut lso to minimize the distortions its funding might useF 4 Conclusion he reent sovereign det risis in iurope hs tested the resiliene of the most mitious suprE ntionl endevour seen in the old ontinentF he viility of the ommon urrenyD nd of iuropen integrtion itselfD hs een thretenedF he entrl question hs onerned the type nd extent of the response the monetry union should give to symmetri shoks to its memer ountriesF elted to this is the question of wht level of solidrity n e resonly expeted etween memersF he nswers so fr hve een in the diretion of more integrtion nd disiplineD with the fnking nion nd the pisl gompt eing just some exmplesF vooking hedD howeverD the ompletion of fully )edged monetry union requires some form of (sl rrngement t the federl levelF efter llD it ws the inility of domesti (sl poliy to tkle sovereign spred shoks in the ountries most 'eted y the risis tht sprked the severe tensions seen within the iwF his pper sets up nd estimtes model ple of providing onsistent nrrtive of the risisF he model fetures (nnil fritions due to leverge onstrints on nks whih link the vilility of redit to produtive (rms to the vlue of nk9s net worthF homesti nks re lso the suppliers of redit to the governmentD nd re therefore exposed to sovereign redit riskF he pper illustrtes the mehnisms t work during sovereign spred shokD with the model9s dynmis mthing the se of ortugl in PHII when sovereign spreds rose shrplyF st shows tht the rtio of puli det to qh nd the elstiity of sovereign spreds to the (sl outlook n sustntilly mgnify the pssEthrough of sovereign spreds to privte orrowersF he model lso mkes ler tht (sl onsolidtion hs to e more ggressive when sovereign spreds ret shrply to deteriortion in puli (nnes nd the det urden is t the levels seen in the eriphery of the iurozone during the risisF es ontriution to the dete out future (sl pity t the iw levelD this pper proposes two simple (sl trnsfer shemes etween memer ountries of monetry unionF nder these shemesD trnsfers re triggered when sovereign spreds widenD lleviting the udgetry strin on the governmentF rnsfers n lso provide stimulus to rel tivity y reduing the negtive impts of distortionry (sl poliyF hen the domesti (sl instrument is lump sum txtionD the proposed (sl rrngements n e welfre improvingF roweverD symmetries ross ountriesD nmely in terms of how domesti poliy is ondutedD my tilt the distriution of welfre gins ross memer sttes nd wekening the support for its implementtionF enother di0ulty rises when domesti (sl instruments re distortionryF elthough (sl trnsfers still redue the distortionry (sl djustment in reipient ountries nd redue eonomi voltilityD they might ese to e welfre improvingF purther reserh should investigte the mehnisms y whih these frgilities n e reE duedF wo extensions seem prtiulrly relevntF yn the one hndD one ould onsider symmetri domesti (sl poliyD in the sense tht the (sl instrument used to stilise the (sl stne ould di'er from the instrument used to fund the trnsfersF his hs the potentil to lessen the distorE tionry osts of the trnsfer sheme nd therefore to mke trnsfers welfre improving even in n QH environment where governments use distortionry txtion to stilise the (sl stneF yn the other hndD one ould ssume tht trnsfersD insted of going to the governmentD re hnnelled to the nking setorF gredit provision to nks ould redue the ontrtion of privte lending to Sensitivity Analysis: le R serves s ompnion tle to le QD with further sensitivity nlysis over di'erent prmeter vlues for the domesti (sl poliy rulesF es eforeD the vlues of κ s were otined y minimizing the omined voltility of qh in oth regionsF hen the doE mesti poliy instrument is lump sum txtionD oth trnsfer shemes re welfre improvingF yn the ontrryD when domesti (sl poliy is distortionryD welfre fllsF ith distortionry instrumentsD nd under pD the quiker domesti poliy is in stilising the (sl stne @iFeF the higher κ c nd κ g AD the higher the size of the (sl trnsfers tht minimizes the voltility of qhF snterestE inglyD the resulting welfre losses re lowerX the mitigtion of the (sl djustment required fter QR to 60%D while the drker res orrespond lso to determiny regions when the rtio is equl to 120%F por ll (sl instrumentsD (sl onsolidtion needs to e more ggressive the more elsti re sovereign spreds to the vritions in the (sl stneF sn order to void negtive feedEk e'etsD wherey n inrese in the puli detEtoEqh rtio rises sovereign spreds ndD onsequentlyD inreses the pssEthroughD fores nks to ontrt redit supply further nd deepens the reessionD the government is fored to t more swiftly nd redue the de(it more quiklyF smportntlyD higher stedy stte vlue for the puli detEtoEqh rtio lso requires more hwkish (sl poliy response to stilise the (sl stneF sn dditionD for higher puli detEtoEqh rtioD higher QT (rmsF roweverD the results do not hnge signi(ntly when puli spending is utilityEenhning instedF hen lump sum txes re used in ddition to puli spendingD the government n hoose to inrese spending @κ g < 0A while t the sme time it inreses txesF roweverD nd ginD the higher the puli detEtoEqh is nd the more sensitive re sovereign spreds to swings in the (sl stneD the more ggressive txtion needs to e if the government hooses to inrese spendingF ith high rtios of puli det nd in n environment where sovereign spreds were notoriE ously sensitive to the evolution of the (sl stneD the results depited in pigure T re insightful s to rtionlise the implementtion of onsolidtion mesures s seen in the eriphery of the iurozone during the sovereign det risisF vikewiseD the model provides support to the limits to puli det nd udget de(its presried sine the erly stges of the iuropen monetry unionD s ountries with lower puli det hve less restritions to the use of domesti (sl poliy to sor shoksF xeverthelessD how should the iurozone respond when ountries experiening (sl strin re fored to ontrt domesti (sl poliy insted of u'ering the reessionry e'ets of lrge shoksc QU 6 Appendix: Bayesian Estimation he model is estimted for ortugl nd the iurozone using fyesin tehniquesF pirstD the equiliE rium onditions re logElinerised round deterministiD zeroEin)tion stedy stteF o redue the numer of prmeters to estimteD some re lirtedD inluding those tht re wekly identi(ed y dtF por the remining prmetersD the priors for estimtion re spei(ed sed on previous studiesF he wetropolisErstings lgorithm is then employedD with two hins of 125.000 drwsD to otin the posterior distriutionsF 21 6.1 Calibrated Parameters he lirted prmeters n e rrnged into four groupsF he (rst group inludes those usully lirted in the literture nd for whih onsensul vlues re pikedF he seond group ontins the prmeters relted to the nking setorD whih re not estimted euse of the lk of qulity time series to identify themF egrding these two sets of prmetersD they re ssumed to e equl ross ountriesF he prmeters tht pin down stedy stte rtios onstitute the third group nd their vlues re hosen to mth longErun verges in the dtF pinllyD the prmeters governing (sl poliy in setion Q form the forth groupF le S reports the vlues for the lirted prmetersF rerefterD the home ountry represents ortuglD the iurozone is the foreign ountryD nd one period in the model orresponds to one qurterF he vlues for the (rst set of prmeters re tken from vm nd nl (2014)F he vlues for the prmeters relted to the nking setor re tken from qertler nd urdi (2011)F vm nd nl (2014) nd fool (2013) estimte some of these prmeters nd otin very lose estimtes to the vlues used hereF yn the other hndD the spred on the sovereign interest rte is only ment to e illustrtive ndD thereforeD reltively smll vlue is ssumedD elow the one used y hert nd ijnergen (2011) nd more in line with wht the dt from efore PHHW suggestsF egrding the third groupD the shre of the popultion living in ortugl is set to 3% of the totl of the iurozoneY the rtio of per capita qh etween the iw nd ortugl is equl to 1.7Y nd the shre of imports to qh in ortuglD whih orresponds to 1 − ω in the modelD is set to 30%F lugging these (gures into the stedy stte version of the demnd equtions for (nl goods in oth ountries nd using the ggregte resoure onstrinD the degree of home is in the iurozone otined is ω = 0.995F reneD while ortugl is reltively sensitive to shoks pertining to the urreny reD the iurozone is lmost immune to shoks originting in ortuglF estimation and welfare analysis being performed using Dynare's interface. Estimation was performed under a rstorder log-linear approximation, whereas the welfare analysis was done on a second-order log-linear approximation to the model's equilibrium conditions.
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The value for ω is perfectly consistent with the way the monetary union has been modelled: Portugal represents a very small share of Eurozone trade. The mismatch of ω with the data has two sources. On the one hand, countries outside the EMU have not been accounted for, despite the large share they represent in terms of trade ows with the Eurozone. On the other hand, aggregate trade data for the Eurozone includes exports and imports within member states, magnifying the nal values of net-exports. There are, however, a number of studies running Bayesian estimation for the Eurozone and using the same data set, which allows for the comparison of the results obtained here. On the contrary, given that estimates for Portugal are rare, it seems preferable to use a calibration that is as consistent as possible with Portuguese time series in order to minimize the chances of blurring the estimates. Finally, as discussed QV por the poliy prmetersD stndrd nd perhps onservtive lirtion ws hosenF he rtio of puli det to nnul qh is set equl to the upper limit imposed y the wstriht rety of 60%D whih is lose to the smple verge for ortugl efore the lst hlf dedeF qovernment expenditures re ssumed to follow stndrd AR (1) proessF egrding the (sl rulesD κ τ = 0.3D while κ c nd κ g were set to 0F
6.2 Data and Priors istimtion ws done over smple of 14 qurterly time series E 7 for eh region E spnning etween the (rst qurter of 1995 nd the lst qurter of 2014F he vriles inluded nominl qhD household onsumptionD investmentD government expendituresD ompenstion of employeesD the onsumer prie index nd nominl interest rteD whih will e de(ned shortlyF xtionl ounts dt for ortugl is tken from the iurosttD wheres the igf ere ide wodel is used for the iurozoneF feuse ortugl ounts for just 3% of the urreny reD it seems unlikely tht the use of ggregte dt for the entire iurozoneD inluding ortuglD onstitutes signi(nt soure of estimtion isF gonsumer pries re from the igf @rsg indiesAF egrding the interest rtesD the IHEyer government ond yield from the iurostt is used for ortugl nd the iurior QEmonth series from the igf is hosen for the iurozoneF 23 ell vriles re lredy sesonlly djusted from the soure exept for onsumer priesD whih re djusted using the EIQeswe proedure developed y the gensus fureuF o e onsistent with the modelD the ntionl ount ggregtes re onverted into per capita quntities using qurterly popultion series from the iurosttF he sme is done for wgesD whih re otined dividing ompenstion of employees y the numer of employeesD lso from the iurosttF he reson ehind using nominl vriles reltes to model onsisteny s wellF qiven tht ll ggregtes hve the sme de)tor in the modelD nd to ensure the resoure onstrints in eh region re metD the onsumer prie index is used to onvert ll nominl quntities into rel vrilesF vstlyD the logs nd (rst di'erenes of rel quntities nd wges re tken in order to render them sttionryF ith one exeption thoughX ortuguese government expenditures remin nonEsttionry fter these trnsformtionsF hereforeD the shre of government expenditure to qh is used insted nd the orresponding hnges in the model re implementedF egrding the nominl vrilesD onsumer prie in)tion is omputed y tking logs nd (rst di'erenes of the prie level seriesD wheres the nominl interest rtes re divided y RHH to onvert them to qurterly seriesF xominl interest rtes re used in levels euse they re sttionry oth in the dt nd in the modelF pinllyD ll vriles re demened efore estimtionF hue to the inlusion of world tehnology shok with unit rootD rel quntities nd wges re lso nonEsttionry in the modelF gonsequentlyD these vriles re divided y the level of world tehnologyF etul vriles re mthed to their model ounterprt y noting tht ∆y o t = ∆ỹ t +ε u t D where ∆y o t orresponds to the (rstEdi'erene of the log of oservle rel vrilesD ∆ỹ t is the growth of its ounterprt in the model @ỹ t denotes the detrended logEdevitions from the stedy stteAD nd later, measurement errors have been added to the net exports of both countries to minimize the potential bias caused by the calibration.
23 Accordingly, I set λ b = 0.025, which implies an average maturity of government bonds of 40 quarters, and calibrate the value of the coupon, µ b , such that in the steady state the price of government bonds equals the price of loans to rms, q b = qx . QW ε u t the innovtion to the stohsti trend in logsF sn totlD the following 14 vriles re mthedX
F rior distriutions re sed on previous studies preforming fyesin estimtion of hqi models of the iurozone using the sme dtset used hereF qiven tht the literture on ortugl is omprtively less pro(uousD the prior distriutions for ortuguese prmeters re set identil to their iurozone ounterprtsF xeverthelessD due to the signi(ntly higher voltility of ortuguese timeEseriesD the priors for the stndrd devitions re more di'use thn in previous studiesF rior distriutions re shown in les T to VF he gmm distriution is hosen for prmeters ssumed to e positiveF riors for the hit prmeters nd for the lour disutility oe0ient re tken from vm nd nl 
